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WHO ARE THE MÉTIS?
THE ROLE OF FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT IN
IDENTIFYING A MÉTIS RIGHTS-HOLDER
Karen Drake1
1. Introduction
The rise of the duty to consult and accommodate has generated an increase in Indigenousindustry agreements.2 For proponents tasked with carrying out the procedural aspects of the duty,
Indigenous-industry agreements offer relative certainty compared to the ambiguity involved in
determining whether the duty has been legally satisfied.3 For Indigenous peoples, although the
drawbacks of Indigenous-industry agreements are well documented,4 these agreements can
potentially instantiate the principle of free, prior and informed consent. Compared to First Nation
and Inuit peoples, though, Métis rights-holders are entering into comparatively fewer
Indigenous-industry agreements.5 One cause of this phenomenon is the supposed uncertainty
surrounding the question of who are the Métis, which can be divided into three sub-questions: (i)
Who qualifies as a Métis rights-holder to whom the duty to consult and accommodate is owed?
(ii) How do we determine the geographic scope of the Métis rights-holder? (iii) Who is entitled
to represent the Métis rights-holder for the purposes of engaging in consultation about the right?
1

Associate professor at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University and citizen of the Métis Nation of
Ontario. I wish to recognize and thank Emma Baumann and Gabrielle Pellerin for their valuable research
assistance. I also wish to acknowledge and thank Jason Madden and Megan Strachan for their insights in
formulating the topic of this paper. Views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Métis Nation of Ontario. All errors are my own.
2
See Dwight Newman, “The Rule and Role of Law: The Duty to Consult, Aboriginal Communities, and
the Canadian Natural Resource Sector” (May 2014) Macdonald-Laurier Institute Papers Series at 12-13
[Newman, “Role of Law”].
3
See Newman, “Role of Law”, ibid at 13; Dwight Newman, Natural Resource Jurisdiction in Canada
(Markham, ON: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2013) at 99.
4
See e.g. Emilie Cameron & Tyler Levitan, “Impact and Benefit Agreements and the Neoliberalization of
Resource Governance and Indigenous-State Relations in Northern Canada” (2014) 93 Stud Polit Econ 29;
Guillaume Peterson St-Laurent & Philippe Le Billon, “Staking Claims and Shaking Hands: Impact and
Benefit Agreements as a Technology of Government in the Mining Sector” (2015) 2 Extr Ind Soc 590.
5
Natural Resources Canada, Agreements Between Mining Companies and Aboriginal Communities or
Governments (Ottawa: Minerals and Metals Sector, Natural Resources Canada, 2013), online:
<www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/mineralsmetals/files/pdf/abor-auto/aam-eac-e2013.pdf>.
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Recently, governments have sought to avoid the duty to consult and accommodate by
attempting to insert these three sub-questions into the test for triggering the duty to consult and
by arguing that Métis rights-holders cannot satisfactorily answer the three sub-questions. If the
duty is not triggered, proponents have little or no incentive to negotiate an Indigenous-industry
agreement. The lower court decisions adopting the three sub-questions should be rejected
because they contradict Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence affirming a low threshold for
triggering the duty to consult.6 In the meantime, to get to the negotiation table, Métis rightsholders need a strategy for answering these three sub-questions.
In this chapter, I examine the jurisprudence on the three sub-questions with a focus on the
latter two, given the exhaustive literature already devoted to the first.7 I argue that the Métis
Nation of Ontario’s approach to consultation—which has been lauded by independent experts 8—
not only provides clear answers to the three sub-questions but also ensures consent given by the
Métis Nation of Ontario to Indigenous-industry agreements is fully informed. The Métis Nation
of Ontario’s approach can guide other Aboriginal peoples seeking to enter into Indigenousindustry agreements.
Readers who are unfamiliar with the Métis nation may desire, at the outset, a definition of
Métis people. This is precisely the issue raised by the three sub-questions discussed throughout
this chapter, and especially by the first sub-question. In the context of this analysis, any pithy,
introductory definition of the Métis would be unhelpful.9

See Jason Madden, Zachary Davis & Megan Strachan, “Recent Legal Developments on Métis
Consultation in Alberta: A Case Summary of MNA Local #125 v. Alberta” (Pape Salter Teillet LLP) at 3,
8, online: <http://albertametis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PST-LLP-Summary-MNA-125-Local-vAlberta-Feb-2017-2.pdf>. See also Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at paras 34, 55 [Mikisew Cree]; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal
Council, [2010] 2 SCR 659 at para 40.
7
See Kerry Sloan, “Always Coming Home: Metis Legal Understandings of Community and Territory”
(2016) 33 Windsor YB Access to Just 125; Chris Andersen, “Métis”: Race, Recognition, and the
Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) [Andersen, “Métis”]; Sébastien
Grammond & Lynne Proulx, “Finding Metis Communities” (2012) 32:1 Canadian Journal of Native
Studies 33; D'Arcy Vermette “Colonialism and the Process of Defining Aboriginal People” (2008) 31
Dalhousie LJ 21; Paul LAH Chartrand, “Defining the ‘Métis’ of Canada: A Principled Approach to
Crown-Aboriginal Relations” in Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds, Métis-Crown Relations: Rights,
Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 27; Larry N Chartrand, “The
Definition of Métis Peoples in Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982” (2004) 67 Sask L Rev 209;
Catherine Bell, “Who are the Metis People in Section 35(2)?” (1991) 29 Alta L Rev 351.
8
See Thomas Isaac, A Matter of National and Constitutional Import: Report of the Minister’s Special
Representative on Reconciliation with Métis: Section 35 Métis Rights and the Manitoba Metis Federation
Decision (June 2016) at 21, online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1467641790303/1467641835266>;
Bryn Gray, Building Relationships and Advancing Reconciliation through Meaningful Consultation:
Report to the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (May 30, 2016) at 21, online: <www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1498765671013/1498765827601>.
9
Those who are unable to read further without some guidance about the definition of ‘Métis’ can read the
text accompanying notes 30-34 in section 3.1 below.
6
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2. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate and the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed
Consent
Proponents may be reluctant to enter into Indigenous-industry agreements with the Métis for two
reasons: first, proponents might assume that consent is required from the Métis nation less often
than it is required from First Nation or Inuit peoples. Second, governments have argued that the
duty is not triggered if the rights-bearing Métis people cannot be sufficiently identified.10 This
section dispels the first concern; subsequent sections address the second concern.
The duty to consult and accommodate arises in at least three distinct situations, only two
of which are discussed here: asserted rights and established rights. 11 First, the duty arises when
Aboriginal rights protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198212 are asserted but not
yet proven in court or admitted by the Crown. 13 In the context of asserted rights, the Crown is not
required to obtain the consent of the affected Aboriginal people; that is, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that Aboriginal peoples do not have a veto prior to Crown or court recognition
of their rights.14 The duty is not a duty to agree. 15
Second, the duty to consult and accommodate continues to apply even after Aboriginal
rights have been established in court. At this stage, though, the duty to consult and accommodate
is only one of several requirements that governments must satisfy in order to justify an
infringement of an Aboriginal right. 16 Unlike the context of asserted rights, in some cases of
established rights—such as established Aboriginal title—the Crown must obtain the full consent
of the Aboriginal people before courts will allow the Crown to infringe the right. 17
To summarize, consent is not required in the context of asserted rights but can be
required in some cases of established rights. Given the dearth of appellate level decisions about
the Aboriginal rights of the Métis compared to the Aboriginal rights of First Nations,18
proponents might assume that Métis rights are primarily asserted and not established. When
consent is not required because the right is merely asserted, proponents might assume they have
less incentive to negotiate an Indigenous-industry agreement.
10

Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Relations), 2016
ABQB 713 at para 269 [FCMNA Local #125].
11
The third is the treaty context, which is not entirely analogous to the situation in which Aboriginal
rights are asserted but not yet proven or admitted by the Crown: Mikisew Cree, supra note 6 at para 48.
12
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
13
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at paras 16, 18, 36 [Haida
Nation].
14
Haida Nation, ibid at para 48
15
Haida Nation, ibid at para 42.
16
R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1113-1119 [Sparrow]. Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2014
SCC 44 at paras 77, 80 [Tsilhqot'in Nation].
17
Haida Nation, supra note 13 at paras 48, 40, citing Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR
1010 at para 168 [Delgamuukw]; Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 16 at 92.
18
See Karen Drake & Adam Gaudry, “‘The lands…belonged to them, once by the Indian title, twice for
having defended them…, and thrice for having built and lived on them’: The Law and Politics of Métis
Title” (2016) 54:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 1.
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The legal reality, though, is more nuanced than this simple binary between asserted and
established rights might suggest. Rights which are asserted either are, or should be, in the process
of being established or admitted, given the Crown’s obligation to negotiate a resolution of
asserted Aboriginal rights, which is a legal duty on the Crown and not merely a moral or political
exhortation.19 What happens if the Crown approves a project while the right is merely asserted,
without obtaining the consent of the Aboriginal people, and then the right is subsequently
established? The Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in Nation explains that in this scenario,
the Crown might be required to cancel the project. 20 This is true even if the Crown fully satisfied
the duty to consult and accommodate as it existed at the time when the right was still merely
asserted. As the Court states, “the level of consultation required may change as the process goes
on and new information comes to light.”21 Proponents might be tempted to engage in the
minimum level of consultation and accommodation required at the time of project approval. But
if proponents want to avoid having their projects subsequently cancelled, obtaining the full
consent of the affected Aboriginal peoples from the outset, even when the right is merely
asserted, is the most prudent course of action. 22 Consent is typically secured through an
Indigenous-industry agreement.
One might assume that consent need not be obtained from the Métis nation because it is
incapable of satisfying the test for Aboriginal title. This assumption is a mistake. As Adam
Gaudry and I have argued elsewhere, the arguments in favour of Métis title are compelling.23
Proponents seeking the certainty provided by Indigenous-industry agreements would do
well to ensure the consent obtained from the relevant Aboriginal people is genuine. As Dwight
Newman recognizes, Indigenous-industry agreements may be subject to legal challenge when
members of the Aboriginal people disagree about their governance structure and about the terms
of the agreement.24 The principle of free, prior and informed consent can provide guidance to
proponents who want to ensure the consent of Indigenous signatories to Indigenous-industry
agreements is genuine in order to protect themselves from future legal challenges. Section 3.3
below analyzes the Métis Nation of Ontario’s consultation procedures to show how these
procedures ensure that consent given by the Métis Nation of Ontario to an Indigenous-industry
agreement is truly informed. But first, sections 3.1 and 3.2 below discuss the first two subquestions identified in the introduction, given that the third sub-question builds on issues raised
by the first two.

19

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 16 at para 17, citing Haida Nation, supra note 13 at para 25.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, ibid at para 92.
21
Haida Nation, supra note 13 at para 45.
22
See John Borrows, “Wise Practices in Indigenous Economic Development and Environmental
Protection” at 24.
23
Drake & Gaudry, supra note 18.
24
Dwight Newman, “Political Rhetoric Meets Legal Reality: How to Move Forward on Free, Prior and
Informed Consent in Canada” (August 2017) Macdonald-Laurier Institute Papers Series at 15 [Newman,
“Legal Reality”].
20
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3. Identifying Métis Rights-Holders to Whom the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Is
Owed
3.1 First Sub-Question: Who Qualifies as A Métis Rights-Holder?
A section 35 Aboriginal right is held by an Aboriginal collective. 25 Although Aboriginal and
treaty rights can be exercised or assigned to individuals, the rights-holder is the collective,26 in
contrast to the liberal paradigm in which the rights-holder is the individual.27 Powley affirms the
collective nature of Métis Aboriginal rights.28 Because the right is held by the collective, the duty
to consult and accommodate is owed to the collective as opposed to being owed to individuals. 29
This brings us to the first sub-question of who qualifies as a rights-bearing Métis people.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Powley answered this question by quelling the Métis-as-mixed
approach according to which the term “Métis” refers to a race-based category, such that the
Métis are merely a collection of individuals with mixed ancestry. 30 Instead, the Supreme Court in
Powley adopted something closer to a nationhood approach, which holds that the term “Métis”
refers “to distinctive peoples who, in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own
customs, way of life, and recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and
European forebears.”31 In other words, the offspring of the initial unions between European men
and First Nations women were individuals who merely possessed mixed European and First
Nations ancestry. 32 But over the course of successive generations, a distinct Métis culture and
collective identity emerged which was separate and distinguishable from either First Nations or
European cultures.33 To be rights-bearing, according to Powley, such collectives must have
emerged prior to the effective imposition of European control. 34
The Métis Nation of Ontario has made substantial progress toward identifying the areas
in Ontario where a distinctive Métis people emerged who developed their own customs,
traditions, and collective identity prior to European control. Since 2004—shortly after the release
25

Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26 at paras 30, 35 [Behn].
Behn, ibid at para 33.
27
See Dale Turner, This is not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 13; Gordon Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2005)
2 Indigenous LJ 67 at 81.
28
R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at para 24 [Powley].
29
Behn, supra note 25 at para 30. See also Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC
53 at para 35.
30
Powley, supra note 28 at para 10.
31
Powley, ibid at para 10. See also R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at para 9; FCMNA Local #125, supra note 10
at para 191. But see Andersen, “Métis”, supra note 7 at ch 4.
32
See Jason Madden, “The Métis Nation’s Self-Government Agenda: Issues and Options for the Future”
in Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds, Métis-Crown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and
Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008) 323 at 327 [Madden, “Self-Government Agenda”]. See also
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Perspectives and Realities, vol 4 (Ottawa:
Canada Communication Group—Publishing, 1996) at 199-200 [RCAP, Perspectives], cited in Powley,
supra note 28 at para 10.
33
Powley, ibid at paras 10-11, 23; Madden, “Self-Government Agenda”, ibid; RCAP, Perspectives, ibid.
34
Powley, ibid at paras 10, 17, 18.
26
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of the Powley decision—the Métis Nation of Ontario and the province of Ontario have worked
collaboratively to identify seven historic Métis communities in Ontario who satisfy the
requirements set out in Powley and outlined above.35 The Métis Nation of Ontario cautions that
the research underlying the recognition of these seven communities is not comprehensive, but
rather is based on information available to date. 36 As research continues, these communities may
be expanded and/or additional historic Métis communities in Ontario may be identified. 37
Although various additional requirements must also be met before a Court will uphold a
Métis right, the Métis Nation of Ontario’s research provides a useful starting point for
proponents seeking to identify a Métis rights-holder in Ontario.
Outside Ontario, the only Métis rights-holder identified by Canadian courts is “the Métis
Nation of the Northwest”38 whose homeland extends into “much of the three prairie provinces,
west into northern British Columbia, east into parts of Ontario, north into the Northwest
Territories, and south into Montana and North Dakota”39 but does not reach east of Ontario.
Although many individuals have claimed to exercise Métis rights east of Ontario, all such claims
have failed; courts have never recognized a Métis rights-holder east of Ontario.40 Although the
Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador affirmed that the Labrador Métis Nation was
owed a duty to consult,41 the Labrador Métis Nation subsequently changed its name to
Nunatukavut, reflecting that it is an Inuit, not a Métis, people.42

3.2. Second Sub-Question: What Is the Geographic Scope of the Métis Rights-Holder?
The second sub-question asks: what are the geographic boundaries of the collective where the
right can be exercised? On the one hand, some Métis advocates assert that the Métis rightsholder is the Métis nation.43 That is, Métis people are entitled to exercise Métis rights throughout
Métis Nation of Ontario, “Historic Métis Communities in Ontario”, online:
<www.metisnation.org/registry/citizenship/historic-métis-communities/> [MNO, “Historic Métis
Communities”].
36
MNO, “Historic Métis Communities”, ibid.
37
MNO, “Historic Métis Communities”, ibid.
38
Jean Teillet, Métis Law in Canada (Vancouver: Pape Salter Teillet LLP, 2013) (loose-leaf 2017
supplement), ch 1 at 20.
39
Adam Gaudry & Karen Drake, “The Resilience of Métis Title: Rejecting Assumptions of
Extinguishment for Métis Land Rights” in Yvonne Boyer & Larry Chartrand, eds, Métis Rising, vol 1
(Vancouver: UBC Press, forthcoming in 2020) at n 2.
40
See Darryl Leroux, Distorted Descent: White Claims to Indigenous Identity (Winnipeg: University of
Manitoba Press, 2019); Adam Gaudry & Darryl Leroux, “White Settler Revisionism and Making Metis
Everywhere: The Contemporary Evocation of Metissage in Quebec and Nova Scotia” (2017) 3:1 Journal
of Critical Ethnic Studies 116.
41
Labrador Métis Nation v Newfoundland, 2007 NLCA 75 [Labrador Métis Nation].
42
See Teillet, supra note 38, ch 1 at 21.
43
See e.g. Jean Teillet & Carly Teillet, “Devoid of Principle: The Federal Court Determination That
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 Is a Race-Based Provision” (2016) 13 Indigenous LJ 1 at 11.
See also Larry Chartrand, “The Constitutional Determination of a Métis Rights-Bearing Community:
Reorienting the Powley Test” in Karen Drake & Brenda Gunn, Renewing Relationships: Indigenous
35
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the homeland of the Métis nation.44 On the other hand, governments have advocated for a narrow
definition which limits a Métis rights-holder to “a site-specific physical settlement (village site
and surrounding environs) that is local and fixed in nature”45 or in other words, to “dots on a map
around which boundary circles can be drawn (i.e., the ‘hub and spoke’ approach)”.46 The latter
view results in limited and constricted exercises of rights. This issue is complicated by the
current controversy between the Métis National Council and one of its Governing Members, the
Métis Nation of Ontario, in which the Métis National Council asserts that the geographic scope
of the Métis nation extends into only a portion of Ontario and does not include six of the seven
historic Métis communities identified by the Métis Nation of Ontario and the province of
Ontario.47 In November 2018, the Métis National Council narrowly passed a resolution putting
the Métis Nation of Ontario on probation for one year and requiring it to comply with the Métis
National Council’s delineation of the geographic scope of the Métis homeland as a condition of
lifting its probation.48
The courts have adopted a middle ground between the nationwide approach and
governments’ narrower hub-and-spoke approach by defining Métis rights-holders as being
regional in scope.49 The regional Métis collectives identified by courts span up to 35,000-45,000
square kilometres and encompass thousands of Métis citizens. 50
The courts’ regional approach to identifying the boundaries of the Métis rights-holder
suffers from two flaws which I analyze in the remainder of this section: the courts’ approach is
inconsistent, first, with the applicable constitutional text and second, with the broader
jurisprudence on this topic. Thus, as Jason Madden recognizes, the regional Métis
“communities” produced by the case law are legal fictions which fail to fully reflect historical or
contemporary realities.51
Peoples and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2019) at 180 [Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing
Community”].
44
For the geographical scope of the Métis nation’s homeland, see text accompanying note 39.
45
Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43 at 175. See also Jason Madden, “Métis
Consultation and Accommodation: Answering The ‘Who’ Question (March 2009) at n 30 [unpublished,
on file with the author] [Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”].
46
Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, ibid at 14, 18-19.
47
Clément Chartier, “Addressing the Integrity of the Historic Métis Nation Homeland: Report in
Response to the Métis Nation General Assembly December 2017 Resolution on the Métis Nation of
Ontario” (November 2018) at 4, online: <http://www.metisnation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MNONov-2018-Report-Recommendations-appendices-final.pdf>.
48
Métis Nation of Ontario, “MNO responds to MNC resolutions”, online:
<http://www.metisnation.org/news-media/news/mno-responds-to-mnc-resolutions/>.
49
See Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43 at 169; Madden, “Answering The
‘Who’ Question”, ibid at 17-18; Catherine Bell & Paul Seaman, “A New Era for Metis Constitutional
Rights: Consultation, Negotiation and Reconciliation” (2015) 38 Man LJ 29 at 64-66.
50
See Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, ibid at 18. See e.g. R v Laviolette, 2005 SKPC 70 at
paras 25-28; R v Belhumeur, 2007 SKPC 114 at paras 167-68; R v Goodon, 2008 MBPC 59 at para 48.
The Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Hirsekorn, 2013 ABCA 242, declined to address the question of the
geographic scope of the Métis community, given its conclusion that no Métis community had sufficient
presence in the area at issue prior to effective European control: para 8.
51
Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, ibid at 22. See also Teillet, supra note 38, ch 1 at 33-34.
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3.2.1 Constitutional Text
The applicable constitutional text is section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which
recognizes and affirms the existing Aboriginal rights of the Aboriginal “peoples” and includes
the Métis people among Aboriginal “peoples”.52 Thus, the written text stipulates that the rightsholder is a ‘people’. As Larry Chartrand notes, however, the term ‘people’ is almost entirely
missing from the courts’ discussion of the issue of how to identify the Métis rights-holder.53
Instead, the term most often employed by courts when identifying the rights-holder is
‘community’.54 Courts’ use of the term ‘community’ is inexplicable, given the lack of textual
foundation for it and the lack of equivalence between ‘people’ and ‘community’. While ‘people’
generally connotes ‘nation’, Chartrand explains that ‘community’, from a western perspective,
connotes “a static, preferably agrarian, local group as opposed to a semi-nomadic broad ranging
kinship-based hunting community”, the latter of which better corresponds to Métis social, legal,
and political structures.55 The Court provides no explanation for substituting ‘community’ for
‘peoples’ in its analysis. 56 This equivocation allows the Court to mask its departure from the
textual authority that recognizes the rights-holder at the level of nationhood.57
3.2.2 Jurisprudence
The broader jurisprudence also supports the conclusion that the nation is the rightsholder. Powley allows for the possibility of identifying a “community” at a high level of
generality: “a Métis community can be defined as a group of Métis with a distinctive collective
identity, living together in the same geographic area and sharing a common way of life” as
established by evidence of “shared customs, traditions, and a collective identity”.58 As Chartrand
explains, this definition is potentially flexible enough to support the conclusion that the rightsholder should be defined as being national in scope.59 The rights-holder is defined in terms of
shared cultural markers such as customs, traditions, and a distinctive collective identity, all of
which are consistent with nationhood. 60
Moreover, the trial judge in Powley explicitly rejected the Crown’s attempt to define the
rights-holder in that case narrowly.61 Instead, the trial judge adopted the regional approach by
defining the “rights-bearing Métis community” as extending, at a minimum, “hundreds of
kilometres to the east, north and west of Sault Ste. Marie, spanning almost 20,000 square

52

Supra note 12.
See Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43 at 171.
54
Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, ibid at 172.
55
Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, ibid at 171-72.
56
Powley, supra note 28 at paras 11-12.
57
See Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43 at 171.
58
Powley, supra note 28 at paras 12, 23. See also FCMNA Local #125, supra note 10 at para 197.
59
Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43.
60
But see Andersen, “Métis”, supra note 7 at 17-20.
61
R v Powley, [1999] 1 CNLR 153 (OCJ) at paras 68, 70 [Powley Trial Decision]. See also Madden,
“Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, supra note 45 at 14-15.
53
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kilometres on the Canadian side” and reaching into northern Michigan. 62 The Supreme Court of
Canada upheld these findings. 63 The regional approach in Powley, however, is not a precedent
for rejecting the nationwide approach, given that the issue of whether the rights-holder could be
defined at a nationwide level was not at issue and so was not addressed.64 Thus, as Madden
concludes, it is a mistake for courts to try to replicate fictional regional Powley ‘communities’ if
the historical evidence supports a nationwide approach.65
This issue was raised squarely in the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s claim to Aboriginal title, where
the trial judge applied the factors set out in Powley for identifying the rights-holder.66 The trial
judge concluded that the proper rights-holder of both the claimed Aboriginal rights and title was
the Tsilhqot’in people or nation—and not the individual bands or sub-entities making up the
Tsilhqot’in Nation—because the shared language, customs, traditions, and historical experience
required by the Powley test existed at the level of the larger nation. 67 In applying these factors,
the trial judge looked to the people’s own traditions and customs for self-identification.68 The
British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed this approach.69 The courts identified the nation as
the rights-holder, despite the absence of any overarching social or political organization or
decision-making body at the national level. 70 The trial judge concluded that requiring the rightsholder to have its own governance structure would be ethnocentric and would ignore Aboriginal
peoples’ own culture and norms. 71 The Court of Appeal added that even though Tsilhqot'in
governance and decision-making structures traditionally existed at the level of smaller
collectives, courts must not attempt to find modern counterparts of these smaller collectives. If
courts were to insist that only the smaller collective with a clear governance structure was the
rights-holder, then “no one would be able to claim Aboriginal rights on behalf of the Tsilhqot'in”
given the fluidity of the Tsilhqot'in political structure.72 A right without a right-holder is hollow.
The province, “to its credit”—as the Supreme Court of Canada put it—did not pursue these
issues at the Supreme Court of Canada. 73
To summarize, the identification of a rights-holder requires cultural markers which are
consistent with nationhood, but not necessarily a governance structure at the national level.
Madden, “Self-Government Agenda”, supra note 32 at 14. See also Powley Trial Decision, ibid at paras
21, 26, 28; Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”, supra note 43 at 177.
63
Powley, supra note 28 at paras 21, 26, 28.
64
See Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, supra note 45 at 15-16; Chartrand, “Métis RightsBearing Community”, supra note 43 at 187. See also Powley, ibid at para 12.
65
Madden, “Answering The ‘Who’ Question”, ibid at 16.
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Villages or bands could be, but are not necessarily, rights-holders.74 The answer in any given
case will depend on the rights-holder’s own traditions, especially those pertaining to collective
identification.75 In at least one case, the evidence indicated that each of the smaller collectives
who share a common language, culture and history were the rights-holders.76 In many more
cases, courts have held that the nation is the rights-holder.77
The tests applied by the courts in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case support the conclusion that
the geographic scope of the Métis rights-holder can be defined at a nationhood level. Granted,
the seven historic communities jointly identified by the Métis Nation of Ontario and the province
of Ontario seem to be defined at a regional level, perhaps because of the limits of currently
available research 78 or perhaps to cohere with the current state of the jurisprudence recognizing
regional Métis communities. But as mentioned above, the Métis Nation of Ontario acknowledges
that eventually these communities may be expanded based on additional research.79

3.3 Third Sub-Question: Who Is Entitled to Represent the Métis Rights-Holder for the
Purpose of Consultation?
The issue of delineating the geographic boundary of the rights-holder is distinct from the issue of
determining who is entitled to represent the rights-holder for the purpose of consultation. For
example, even if the rights-holder is the larger nation, a national level authority is not necessarily
entitled or required to serve as the consultation representative.80 This follows from the principle
discussed above that a nation who is a rights-holder need not possess a governance or decisionmaking structure at the national level. For example, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
concluded that even though the Tsilhqot'in Nation was the rights-holder, a smaller entity within
the nation—the Xeni Gwet'in—was the custodian of the specific area at issue and thus held
responsibility for administering and protecting the rights,81 which presumably includes engaging
in consultations. How, then, is the proper representative identified?
The jurisprudence on this issue is in its infancy. 82 The Supreme Court of Canada’s
guidance is minimal and some of the pronouncements of lower courts reveal inconsistencies. In
his report to the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Bryn Gray warned: “Determining
who speaks for asserted or established rights-holders is a fundamental issue and this needs to be
74
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resolved on a priority basis.”83 For proponents wishing to overcome the ambiguity intrinsic to the
duty to consult by entering into Indigenous-industry agreements, the certainty offered by such
agreements will be a mirage if an authoritative representative of the rights-holder cannot be
identified. As Newman explains, the potential obstacles to determining who speaks for a rightsholder correlate with the issue of how to obtain genuine consent.84 To ensure a rights-holder has
genuinely consented to an Indigenous-industry agreement, the representative signatory to the
agreement must have the proper authorization of the rights-holder. The following propositions
can be deduced from the existing jurisprudence and are discussed in turn below. First, a rightsholder can authorize a representative, including a corporation, to engage in consultation and
enforce the duty to consult on its behalf. Second, the authorization need not be specific and it can
be demonstrated by the governing documents of either the rights-holder or the representative. In
most circumstances, the citizenry of the rights-holder likely need not be coextensive with the
members of the representative. Third, courts are divided on whether consultation can be owed to
overlapping sub-entities of the rights-holder.
The Métis Nation of Ontario’s innovative approach to consultation complies with the
existing jurisprudence, and even reconciles some of the jurisprudential inconsistencies. In so
doing, the Métis Nation of Ontario serves as an exemplar for ensuring consent is informed.
3.3.1 A Rights-Holder Can Authorize a Representative to Engage in and Enforce
Consultation
A rights-holder is entitled to authorize a representative to engage in consultation and
enforce the duty to consult and accommodate in court. The Supreme Court of Canada explains in
Behn that “an Aboriginal group can authorize an individual or an organization to represent it for
the purpose of asserting its s. 35 rights”.85 The representative may take the form of a
corporation.86 Older, lower court decisions which prevented corporations from litigating section
35 rights did so on the ground that the corporation—as distinct from the collective which is the
rights-holder—has no direct interest in the right. 87 Where corporations have been permitted to
represent section 35 rights-holders, courts have relied on evidence that the rights-holder
authorized the corporation to represent it.88
Allowing corporations to represent rights-holders is consistent with current practices of
both First Nations and the Métis nation. With respect to First Nations, section 3.2 above showed
that the legal entities created by legislation—band councils—are not necessarily rights-holders.
Thus, First Nations sometimes incorporate entities to represent them at the nationhood level. 89
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With respect to the Métis, for the most part, no analogue to the Indian Act exists.90 Thus, most
Métis governance structures necessarily operate as not-for-profit corporations or societies. 91
3.3.2 Authorization Need Not Be Specific and It Can Be Demonstrated by the
Governing Documents of Either the Rights-Holder or the Representative
What do courts look for when assessing whether an entity has been authorized to
represent a rights-bearer? This issue has been considered only recently by lower courts but not
yet by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Behn, the Supreme Court of Canada held that without
authorization from the First Nation, individual members of that First Nation could not assert a
breach of the duty to consult and accommodate. 92 The Court did not consider what would
constitute sufficient evidence of authorization, because the appeal was from a decision on a
motion to strike pleadings, and thus the Court was confined to the pleadings (which lacked an
allegation of authorization). 93
Authorization has been demonstrated in lower court decisions by the governing
documents of either the representative or the rights-holder. Examples of the former include the
preamble to an entity’s memorandum and articles of association,94 a corporation’s constitution,95
and a corporation’s bylaws (suggested in obiter).96 An example of the latter is the resolution of a
band council to be represented by an incorporated society.97
Must the authorization specify the precise project in question or proponent to be
consulted? How specific must the authorization be? In cases where courts accepted the
authorization, the purpose identified was not especially specific: these authorizations referred to
an entitlement to consultation regarding Aboriginal rights,98 to promoting the interests and rights
of the rights-holder,99 to representation with respect to consultation protocols and
accommodation agreements,100 to advancing “constitutional, legal, political, social and economic
rights” and to negotiating “agreements to advance and support the inherent right of selfgovernment and self-determination.”101 In Enge v Canada, the Federal Court held that the
general objects set out in the registered society’s constitution authorizing it to represent its
members’ legal rights—including the right of self-government—was sufficient to allow it to
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commence an application alleging a breach of the duty to consult. 102 It was not necessary for the
registered society to also obtain a resolution or any other membership approval specifically
authorizing the application. 103 Thus, when the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in Fort
Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Relations)
implies in obiter that the authorization should indicate the “specific purpose” of the
representation,104 it is out of step with prevailing jurisprudence.
The Métis Nation of Ontario’s governance structure has been praised by Thomas Isaac, in
his capacity as the Minister’s Special Representative on Reconciliation with Métis, as an
example of an entity with proper authorization to represent the rights-bearing people.105 The
legal entity that gives effect to the Métis Nation of Ontario’s governance structure is the Métis
Nation of Ontario Secretariat (the Secretariat), which is a corporation.106 The Secretariat’s
Bylaws incorporate the Métis Nation of Ontario’s Statement of Prime Purpose, which is the
Métis Nation of Ontario’s foundational constituting document and which provides that the Métis
Nation of Ontario is the “representative body” of that portion of the Métis nation located within
Ontario.107 The “aims and objectives” of the Métis Nation of Ontario include, among other
things, “to ensure that Métis can exercise their Aboriginal and Treaty rights”.108 The Secretariat,
in turn, is the means by which the Métis Nation of Ontario’s governance structure is given legal
effect within the Canadian legal system: “It is the corporate and administrative arm of the Métis
Nation of Ontario, which was created to represent and advocate on behalf of its registered
citizens, and the Métis communities comprised of those citizens, with respect to their collective
rights”.109 These statements are sufficient to authorize the Secretariat to represent the Métis
Nation of Ontario for the purposes of consultation and negotiating Indigenous-industry
agreements.
Must the membership of the representative entity be coterminous with the citizenry of the
rights-holder? For example, in Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta
(Minister of Aboriginal Relations), the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench rejected the
corporation’s claim to represent the rights-holder because the corporation had 173 members but
the population of the rights-holder was between 350 and 1000 individuals, and the corporation
claimed to represent not only its own members but the entire population of the rights-holder.110
The Court held that “a corporate entity with a membership of less than one-fifth of the total
population of [the rights-holder] cannot claim to be representative of the entire Aboriginal
community for the purpose of asserting Aboriginal rights and seeking consultation.”111
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The answer to this question must depend on the context. Logic dictates that the
population of the rights-holder need not be coterminous with the membership of the corporation
when the authorization comes from the rights-holder’s own governance processes (and not from
the corporation’s governing documents). Otherwise, the authorization itself would be
superfluous.112 Logic also dictates that the population of the rights-holder need not be
coterminous with the membership of the corporation when the corporation represents only its
own members.113
The coterminous population issue is not a concern for the Métis Nation of Ontario
because it represents only its own members. The governance structure of the Métis Nation of
Ontario’s Secretariat includes 30 Community Councils which are subject to Community Charter
Agreements between the Secretariat, the Métis Nation of Ontario, and the Community
Council.114 The Community Charter Agreements provide that each Community Council
represents only those who are citizens of the Métis Nation of Ontario.115 Pursuant to the
Secretariat’s Bylaws, the term “citizens” refers to the Secretariat’s members. 116 Similarly, the
Métis Nation of Ontario Secretariat Act, 2015 affirms that the Secretariat represents “its
registered citizens and the Métis communities comprised of those citizens”.117 Having a
coterminous population can promote informed consent. Consent is informed when the different
positions held by those being represented are available for consideration.118 Entities who enter
into Indigenous-industry agreements due to the duty to consult and who claim to represent nonmembers, run the risk of failing to achieve this aspect of informed consent.
One might object that if an Indigenous government such as the Métis Nation of Ontario
wants to serve as the authorized representative of the rights-holder, it must represent each and
every Métis individual located within a given territory. However, this objection is not persuasive
because it attempts to impose a static, Eurocentric conception of a ‘community’ and it overlooks
the doctrinal law, discussed above, which recognizes the fluidity of Indigenous governance
structures.119 A requirement that the rights-holder must encompass every individual within a
given geographic area would deny the autonomy of Métis people to constitute and reconstitute
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themselves as they see fit. 120 As the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated, difficulties in
identifying a rights-holder cannot “be allowed to preclude recognition of Aboriginal rights that
are otherwise proven.”121 Thus it cannot be that only representatives who have the authorization
of every single Métis individual within a given geographic area are entitled to consultation,
because if this were the law, there would be no authorized representatives of Métis rightsholders. A right without a right-holder is hollow. As the majority in R v Van der Peet stated: “It
would be entirely contrary to the spirit and intent of s. 35(1) to define aboriginal rights in such a
fashion so as to preclude in practice any successful claim for the existence of such a right.” 122
One might wonder about the logistics of two or more separate Métis rights-holders exercising
Aboriginal rights within one and the same geographic area. This concern evaporates, however,
when we recall that First Nations and Métis can have Aboriginal rights within one and the same
territory and that doctrinal law allows for Aboriginal title to be held jointly by two or more
Aboriginal peoples.123 It is not unusual for two or more Indigenous peoples to coordinate their
various legal orders within a shared space.124 Canadian law refers to this unexceptional
phenomenon as ‘overlapping Aboriginal claims’, which give rise to a duty to consult more than
one rights-holder in one and the same geographic area.125

3.3.3 Lower Courts Are Divided on Whether Consultation Can Be Owed to
Overlapping Sub-Entities
How do courts determine whether the larger nation or a smaller sub-entity is entitled to be
consulted? As discussed above in section 3.3, the answer is not dictated by determining the
geographic scope of the rights-holder. A rights-holder that exists at a national level is not
necessarily entitled to consultation. Although the Tsilhqot'in Nation was the rights-holder, the
Xeni Gwet'in, a smaller sub-entity, held responsibility for administering the rights in the area at
issue.126 This conclusion was grounded in the Tsilhqot'in Nation’s own laws, as evidenced by
their modern political structure. 127 Thus, Aboriginal people’s laws—not the Crown and not
proponents—determine who is entitled to be consulted. But what happens when both the larger
national entity and the smaller entity claim to be owed consultation? Must the consultation
engage every individual member or sub-collective of the rights-holder?
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Although the Supreme Court of Canada in Behn established that the duty to consult is not
owed to individuals but rather to the collective rights-holder, the Court has not yet considered
whether the duty can be owed to both sub-entities—such as bands or Métis community councils
and locals—and to the larger Aboriginal nation to which the sub-entity belongs.128 Lower court
decisions on this topic are inconsistent. In FCMNA Local #125, the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench held that it would be “a waste of resources for the Alberta Crown to potentially have to
consult with several separate organizations who state that they represent smaller or larger subsets
of the same group in respect of the same interests and the same project.”129 In contrast, in
Nla’pamux Nation Tribal Council v Griffin, the British Columbia Supreme Court held that “the
government must discharge its duty to consult by taking reasonable steps to ensure that all points
of view within a First Nation are given appropriate consideration.”130 The position of the band
most directly affected by a proposed landfill project differed from that of the entity representing
the nation to which the band belonged. 131 The provincial government implemented separate
consultation processes with the band and with the entity representing the nation, which the Court
concluded was appropriate. 132
Even though the outcomes in these two decisions are inconsistent, their underlying policy
values (efficiency vs. fully informed consultations) are not mutually exclusive, and have been
reconciled within the Métis Nation of Ontario’s consultation framework. By integrating the
competing values from the divergent case law, the Métis Nation of Ontario’s consultation
framework ensures that their consent to any Indigenous-industry agreement resulting from the
duty to consult is informed. The Métis Nation of Ontario has established a Lands, Resources and
Consultations Branch (LRC Branch) which employs full-time staff who possess the scientific
and technical expertise needed to support consultation.133 The LRC Branch provides
governments with a “one-window” approach to consultation with the Métis Nation of Ontario.134
Governments can give notice of any proposed project or decision directly to the LRC Branch. 135
The LRC Branch then identifies the relevant sub-entities within the Métis Nation of Ontario’s
governance structure who should be consulted, coordinates their consultation activities, and
provides administrative and technical support to those sub-entities.136 The “one-window”
approach means the onus is not on governments to attempt to determine which sub-entities need
128
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to be consulted, which in turn avoids duplication of government resources from consulting with
overlapping entities. The LRC Branch also helps to ensure consent is informed by providing the
expertise needed to analyze data and documents; it thereby ensures Métis Nation of Ontario
citizens understand the consequences of proposed projects and government decisions. 137 Finally,
a requirement of consent is that the “mechanism used to reach agreement must itself be agreed to
by the Indigenous peoples concerned.”138 The LRC Branch helps to satisfy this requirement as it
is a result of recommendations made by Métis Nation of Ontario citizens during province-wide
consultations undertaken by the Métis Nation of Ontario in 2007-2008.139 As such, it is part of a
mechanism used to reach consent which was previously agreed to by the Métis Nation of
Ontario.
A potential downside of a “one-window” or centralized approach like that of the LRC
Branch—if not executed well—is it could result in consultation becoming siloed as opposed to
ensuring all who are affected have an opportunity to participate in decision-making, as
emphasized in Nla’pamux Nation. The Métis Nation of Ontario has developed an innovative
solution to this dilemma within its governance structure in the form of Regional Consultation
Protocols which are agreements between the Métis Nation of Ontario and the Community
Councils located within each of the Métis Nation of Ontario’s nine regions.140 The Protocols
establish Consultation Committees which include representatives from each of the relevant
Community Councils. Consultation Committees are responsible for developing “a local and
regional MNO citizen engagement plan” and for ensuring “all potentially affected MNO citizens
are engaged and communicated with”.141 By coordinating consultation at both the local and
regional level and across multiple Community Councils, Consultation Committees save
governments from having to undertake this potentially duplicative work. At the same time,
Consultation Committees help to ensure that consent to any Indigenous-industry agreement is
informed by providing a mechanism to allow all affected Métis Nation of Ontario citizens to
engage in the decision-making process and contribute their views.142 Finally, like the LRC
Branch, Consultation Committees are a result of recommendations made by Métis Nation of
Ontario citizens during province-wide consultations undertaken by the Métis Nation of Ontario
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in 2007-2008.143 As such, it functions as part of a mechanism for reaching consent which was
agreed to by the Métis Nation of Ontario, and thus it serves to fulfill a requirement of consent.
4. Conclusion
Proponents are incentivized to enter into Indigenous-industry agreements in order to
overcome the legal ambiguity surrounding the duty to consult, including the possibility that
projects which are initially approved could be cancelled when the right is subsequently
established if the Indigenous nation did not initially consent to the project. To achieve the
certainty desired by proponents, consent to an Indigenous-industry agreement should be free,
prior, and informed. The Métis Nation of Ontario’s consultation procedures help to ensure that
its consent is genuinely informed. The Métis Nation of Ontario Secretariat is a corporation that is
sufficiently authorized to represent the Métis Nation of Ontario in consultations. The Secretariat
does not claim to represent non-citizens of the Métis Nation of Ontario, which avoids the
potential problem of consent being less than fully informed. The Métis Nation of Ontario’s
consultation framework also balances the competing values reflected in the jurisprudence,
including efficiency and fully informed consent. Other Indigenous nations may find guidance
from the various features of the Métis Nation of Ontario’s consultation framework, such as its
LRC Branch and its Consultation Committees.
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